Russia’s development of the PAK FA fifth-generation stealth fighter could challenge American air supremacy, especially if Russia sells the PAK FA to its usual buyers of military equipment. In the U.S., closure of the F-22 production line has severely limited America’s ability to respond to PAK FA proliferation by building more F-22s and potentially selling them to U.S. allies. The U.S. needs to revise its assessment of U.S. air superiority needs and then explore ways to modernize and strengthen the U.S. tactical fighter force.
With America’s closure of the F-22 production line and the recent debut of Russia’s PAK FA fifth-generation stealth fighter, American air supremacy for the foreseeable future is not as assured as the U.S. Department of Defense once predicted. Indeed, Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, recently departed Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in the U.S. Air Force, recently made the startling announcement: “For the first time, our claim to air supremacy is in jeopardy.… The dominance we’ve enjoyed in the aerial domain is no longer ours for the taking.”
To preserve traditional U.S. margins of military technological superiority, Congress should review potentially outdated requirements and projections, and policymakers should push defense officials to enact more forward-looking budgeting and acquisition strategies for U.S. fighter fleets. Increased investment in modernization and new partnerships with allies like Japan and Israel will be necessary to prevent the airpower balance from tilting in favor of the Russian and Chinese air forces and to hedge against the potentially destabilizing proliferation of Russia’s PAK FA fighter to unstable actors, non-state groups, and/or terrorism-sponsoring rogue states around the world. For example, if Syria or Iran acquires the PAK FA, it could provide the fighter to the non-state group Hezbollah to form a proxy air force against Israel.
U.S. Air Power Assumptions Challenged
Defense analysts, officials, and industry personnel have long believed that the U.S. F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter would not face serious threats from foreign fifth-generation fighters for the next 20 years. In September 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repudiated claims of a looming “fighter gap”—a deficit between the services’ fighter aircraft inventories and their operational requirements. “[T]he more compelling gap,” he argued, “is the deep chasm between the air capabilities of the United States and those of other nations.”
In an earlier speech, he argued:
China…is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese.
The Secretary’s claims may now be in doubt. With the cancellation of the F-22 and closure of its production line combined with various development delays in the F-35 program—the mainstay of America’s future fighter fleets—U.S. fighter inventories may be significantly smaller in coming years than initially planned. For example, initial operational capability for the F-35A, the U.S. Air Force version of the F-35, was recently pushed back two years to the end of 2015, now changed to 2016 for both the F-35A and the Navy’s F-35C. These delays often increase production costs, forcing reductions in the overall buy. Regrettably, other fiscal pressures will likely squeeze procurement budgets further in the coming years and prevent the expenditures needed to reach planned F-35 force levels.
Meanwhile, Russian fighter and military modernization efforts are proceeding rapidly, defying the expectations of many. In August, Russia undertook the largest airborne military exercises since the collapse of the Soviet Union, making “use of automated command and control systems.”[6] On January 29, 2010, Russia conducted the first test flight of the T-50, a prototype of the PAK FA, Russia’s fifth-generation fighter jet, which was designed to rival the American F-22. With advanced stealth technology and high-tech avionics, the PAK FA could eventually—as Moscow has repeatedly proclaimed—seriously challenge U.S. air supremacy. Russia is also selling modern fourth-generation fighter aircraft to the Indian, Chinese, Algerian, Vietnamese, and Libyan militaries.
The air forces of Russian defense trade partners—including India, China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Libya—could also pose growing challenges. Russia has already sold hundreds of its best fighter aircraft to China, and may sell China the PAK FA as well. China is Russia’s largest purchaser of Su-27/ Su-30 Flanker fighters, including the more advanced Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2, buying or ordering up to 624 as of 2009. The Su-27/Su-30 fighters are produced by Sukhoi, the same firm that is developing the PAK FA. Indeed, the Komsomolsk-on-Amur KNAAPO factory, which is producing the Su-27/Su-30 fighters, is located in Khabarovsk, a region that borders China. By 2025, China could have up to 120 PAK FA fighters, compared to America’s 187 F-22As.
PAK FA Program and Potential Foreign Exports
While reduced resources and growing internal defense budget imbalances imperil U.S. defense procurement plans, Russian defense spending is getting a boost from oil and gas export revenues, even after the 2008–2010 slump in oil prices. Russia has the third largest gold and hard currency reserves after China and Japan. State coffers have been expanding quickly, with Russia’s foreign reserves increasing from $437 billion at the end of January 2010 to $503.7 billion by October. Although the Russian economy relies heavily on exports of raw materials, the government is unlikely to encounter much difficulty funding the PAK FA program, especially with significant assistance from India, which plans to inject $30 billion into the program.
Furthermore, the PAK FA is expected to be cheaper to produce than the F-22. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has recently claimed that the PAK FA “would be 2.5 to 3 times cheaper.” Currently, the PAK FA is expected to cost less than $100 million per plane, while the F-35 is projected to cost between $100 million and $112 million, and the F-22 will cost around $140 million.
The Russian Defense Ministry initially planned to buy 300 PAK FA fighters, but has since reduced its stated requirement to 250 planes, with a preference for the single-seat version. Whether Russia will meet this target is unclear. As part of the “2011–2020 state arms procurement program,” the ministry is budgeting $656 billion, which includes funding to produce 10 PAK FAs between 2013 and 2015 and 60 additional fighters between 2016 and 2020.
Although Russia is leading the program and shouldering the bulk of the cost, India is set to provide significant assistance, aiming to have a 25 percent stake in designing and developing the fighter. India is currently negotiating with Sukhoi to build an Indian variant called the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). India reportedly plans to purchase 250 of these fighters: 200 twin-seaters and 50 single-seaters, with an option for future orders that could increase the total to 300.
Mikhail Pogosyan, General Director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, has stated: “I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel its Western rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allow strengthening the defense power of Russian and Indian air forces, but also gain a significant share of the world market.” Pogosyan calculates that there could be a world market for 1,000 PAK FAs in the next 40 years.
One likely buyer is China. Although Beijing is reportedly developing its own fifth-generation fighter aircraft (the J-12), the Chinese military could conceivably buy up to 250 PAK FA planes, especially if its own program encounters delays. In addition, Russia would likely seek to export the PAK FA to Algeria, Libya, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Kazakhstan may also purchase the aircraft, as could Malaysia and Vietnam, thanks to their gas and oil revenues. Indonesia may want to buy limited numbers to counterbalance the 100 F-35s that Australia plans to acquire. America’s oil-rich Arab allies may also order PAK FA aircraft if Washington refuses, as expected, to sell them F-35s and instead exports up to 100 F-35s to Israel.
The PAK FA will likely form the basis for several foreign variants, in the same way that the Russian Su-27 Flanker fighter spawned the Su-30MKI multirole fighter for India, the Su-30MKK multirole fighter and Su-30MK2 naval strike fighter for China, the Su-30MKA for Algeria, and the more advanced Su-34 strike aircraft and Su-35 multirole fighter. One possible PAK FA variant is a twin-seat long-range strike version similar to the Su-34 or the proposed (and now shelved) FB-22 bomber version of the F-22.
With its stealth technology, supercruise capability, and sensor fusion, the F-22 was designed to prevail in present and future air battles. It also has the ability to carry smart bombs for precision strike missions in heavily defended battle spaces. Due to its supercruise ability, the F-22 is capable of covering long distances in regions like the Arctic Ocean, the continental U.S., the Western Pacific, and the Persian Gulf with supersonic flight without the need to engage afterburners. Since the PAK FA is planned to have similar capabilities, only the F-22 would be capable of matching the future Russian fighter, if not prevailing over it.
The FB-22 would possess the stealth and supercruise characteristics of the F-22A, and it would provide a stealth and supersonic medium-range bomber capability for the Air Force, filling a niche between the F-35 fighter-bomber and the proposed 2018 long-range bomber.The FB-22 would be able to carry 30 Small Diameter Bombs and have 50 percent more range than the F-22. In the future, Russia may deploy a medium-bomber version of the PAK FA while the U.S. Air Force may be left without such a bomber capability.
According to Russian officials, the joint Russo– Indian PAK FA/FGFA fighter should be ready by 2015 or 2016. It may also incorporate equipment from third countries, just as Russia has previously integrated French and Israeli technology into its weapons systems. Indian officials hope the FGFA will be fully developed by 2016 so that it can enter service in 2017.
With a planned price tag of about $100 million per aircraft, the PAK FA will not be cheap, but it will likely find a market among those countries that have purchased Russia’s Su-27/30 fighters. Many of these countries have substantial foreign currency reserves. Those that want to modernize and expand their militaries, expand their global presence, and become increasingly assertive on the world stage or in their regions will be interested in the PAK FA. If the PAK FA proves to be a success, the U.S. should expect it to proliferate among countries with the means to acquire it and with foreign policies that potentially defy Washington or look toward Moscow.
Understanding the Potential for Trouble
After successful test flights on January 29 and February 12, 2010, the T-50 began standard tests in April. Testing could take several more years, according to sources from Sukhoi and statements by Prime Minister Putin, but some planes could conceivably be deployed in operational units before testing is completed. This would not be unusual. The first operational F-22s were delivered in September 2003, even though testing continued until November 2005.[Colonel General Alexander Zelin, commander in chief of the Russian Air Force, estimates that PAK FA fighters will be delivered to operational units in 2015.In preparation, Russian pilots are already receiving training in piloting fifth-generation fighters.
As one expert recently noted: “In this modern era of stealth combat, there are two types of fighters: stealth fighters and targets.” Similarly, the commander in chief of the Russian navy stated that “it would be impossible to win contemporary and future wars without air and space supremacy. Whoever understands this is on the right path.” Mikhail Pogosyan says that “the most important thing is stealth to enemy radar, which allows the aircraft to approach enemy positions without being noticed.”
One risk is that Russia or potential PAK FA customers around the world could use the sophisticated aircraft to conduct sneak attacks against U.S. forces or allies. Russian doctrine still considers the U.S. its “principal adversary,” even though successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer our enemy.
Viewing the U.S. and NATO as potential opponents in a future war, Russia has designed the PAK FA to compete with the F-22 and to devastate formations of F-35 stealth fighters. It takes more than technology to make an advanced fighter classified as fifth-generation, including pilot skill and training, aircraft, and tactics. It remains to be seen whether Russia will develop advanced operational concepts and fighter doctrine to employ the PAK FA. If this occurs, it is possible that the twin-engine F-22, which was devised as an air superiority fighter, would perhaps be the only credible match for the PAK FA. Even if the F-22 proves superior, PAK FAs may still pose a formidable threat. F-35s, which were partly designed to serve as force multipliers for the F-22, may be vulnerable to PAK FA attack. Although the U.S. plans to build more than 2,000 F-35s, the numerical advantage of the F-35 fleet could potentially be offset by the PAK FA’s larger weapon capacity, especially if it proves technologically superior.
In addition, the PAK FA could pose a threat to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35C Lightning II squadrons operating from America’s aircraft carriers. The Russian navy plans to deploy 15–20 naval PAK FAs on its aircraft carrier after it is modernized, perhaps by 2020. Russia may also seek to reduce the numerical advantage of the overall U.S. fighter fleet by building large numbers of a lighter version of the PAK FA, a possible equivalent to the F-35.
In a dogfight, U.S. Air Force models predict that small formations of F-22 fighters would prevail over far larger numbers of fourth-generation enemy fighters because the F-22’s superior stealth would give it a substantial advantage.[39] However, how the F-22 would fare against the PAK FA is unclear. The PAK FAs may ultimately match the F-22s in capability and possibly outnumber them. It is also unclear how mixed formations of F-22s and more numerous F-35s would fare against PAK FA formations or against combinations of PAK FAs and lighter variants. The Department of Defense needs to develop a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities of the various Russian platforms to accurately gauge the threat to U.S. planes and to develop appropriate responses.